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There has been a consensus among Costa Rican professionals 
and authorities in the sense that renewed economic growth in the 
1980s will require a substantial expansion and diversification of 
exports, particularly to markets beyond Central America. There 
has been somewhat less agreement about the components of the 
policy package that would be required to promote an optimal rate 
of growth of exports. Most of the attention, however, has 
focused on the macroeconomic policy environment and on fiscal 
(tax-cum-subsidy} incentives. Substantial progress has been made 
with respect to exchange-rate policy, after the fiscal-financial 
crisis of the early 1980s made the fixed-exchange-rate system 
unsustainable. The frequent, small devaluations associated with 
the crawling-peg system adopted by the Central Bank have made it 
possible to maintain the competitiveness of Costa Rican 
exporters. Some progress has also been made in reducing the 
anti-export bias of the tariff structure. Export promotion and 
allocative efficiency. however, will require further redu6tion in 
the rate of effective protection of production for the domestic 
market, which has resulted from the import-substitution strategy 
within the Central American Common Market. The nature and 
desirability of export subsidies and other fiscal incentiues 
associated with the "export contract" are still controversial and 
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their effectiveness needs to be demonstrated. Beyond these 
policy interventions, exporters still need to be convinced about 
the stability and permanency of the new rules of the game and 
must generate 
region. All 
optimistic expectations about the future of the 
of this will improve the incentives to devote 
resources to new exporting activities. 
Creating an environment in which prices and incentives are 
correct is a necessary yet insufficient condition for export 
expansion. Once relative prices are right and incentives are 
attractive, resource reallocations and actual output expansion 
take effort and time. How rapidly and how vigorously will export 
supply expand in response to the new price signals? Very little 
is known about the determinants of the elasticity of supply of 
new, non-traditional exports in a small, developing economy like 
Costa Rica. The study by Academia de Centro America, "Costa 
Rica: Exports of Certain Non-Traditional Products," summarized 
here, is an exploration into this unchartered territory. 
Sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the 
study represents the basis for Alberto Franco's Master's Thesis 
at The Ohio State University and it contains seven chapters. The 
introduction lays out the objectives and limitations of the 
study. Chapter I I describes the methodology (of case studies) 
employed to obtain the results. Chapter III surveys earlier 
investigations and relevant contributions to the literature. 
Chapter IV evaluates Costa Rican trade policies since the 1960s. 
Chapter V presents the performance of exports over three decades. 
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Chapter VI, the core of the investigation, presents the results 
of each of the case studies, while Chapter VII derives some 
conclusions from the comparison of such cases. 
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The main objective of the study was to identify key 
determinants of the elasticity of supply of non-traditional 
agricultural exports. That is, to identify opportunities and 
obstacles for the expansion of exports beyond the Central 
American Common Market. The method employed was the 
investigation of case studies at the level of the firm. Each one 
of the case studies provides an analytical history of an 
exporting firm, a description of its operations, and an 
evaluation of the results. A comparison of the cases makes 
possible tentative predictions about the types of exporting firms 
that are likely to succeed in Costa Rica. The factors 
influencing the elasticity of supply are examined for each one of 
the major stages in the export chain: .production, processing, 
packaging, storage, domestic and overseas transportation, 
marketing and financing. The firm's organization for exporting, 
the quality of information and of communications, and its 
managerial ability as well as the nature and role of government 
support are also examined. 
Products to be studied were selected on the basis of recent 
rates of growth of exports, namely: fresh flowers 
(chrysanthemums), fresh strawberries, fresh pineapples, tropical 
fruit and vegetables, hybrid flower seeds, ornamental plants, and 
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shrimp. One firm was investigated for each product line: 
American Flowers, Coopefresa, Pindeco, Hortifruti, Linda Vista, 
Coopeindia, and Compafiia Exportadora de Mariscos, respectively. 
In addition, exports of locally-assembled electronics components 
under an in-bond system (.J!!~.9:.:!!JJ_~) by Motorola de Centro America 
were investigated to compare opportunities and difficulties of 
agricultural and manufacturing exports. By 1990, this set of 
products are expected to represent about five percent of Cos ta 
Rica's total exports. 
The specific firms studied were selected from a list of 
90, which had applied for an export contract, after visits and 
further explorations confirmed their willingness to disclose the 
information desired. Linda Vista, Coopef resa, Coopeindia, 
Pindeco, and Hortifruti have been the major, if not the only, 
force in their business for extended periods. Compafiia 
Exportadora de Mariscos produces and exports one-fifth of all 
frozen shrimp, while American Flowers, in the flower export 
business for over two decades, accounts for three-eights of the 
country's exports of fresh flowers. These firms are most diverse 
in their organizational structure, the origin of their production 
technology, the markets that they have penetrated, and their 
profitability. Numerous interviews with company officials 
(lasting for three hours on the average) and firm records 
provided the data for the analysis. Although, strictly speaking, 
the r:onclusions of the study are applicable only to the firms 
actually investigated, the commonality of results suggests topics 
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for future research and areas of special attention for the 
authorities. These conclusions are the result of inductive and 
creative reasoning, on the basis of the case studies, rather than 
of tests of casualty. They must be accepted with caution . 
.QQ NC..~ !l§J..Ql!~ 
The case studies tell a story of small firms struggling to 
penetrate established, competitive world markets. A long list of 
mishaps and mistakes that have plagued most of these firms have 
resulted in substantial losses, but most of them have been able 
to use these experiences as feedback to improve their 
performance. Learning based on trial and error has been 
unavoidable, given insufficient information and incomplete 
organization for exporting, as well as limited resources to 
invest in research and in management skills. 
Problems and opportunities were found at all the stages of 
the exporting process. Insufficient and inadequate information 
is one of the major constraints. The smaller firms suffer from a 
chronic information weakness, which has not been resolved yet. 
Difficulties are associated with obtaining reliable data on 
production techniques, packaging materials and procedures, 
transportation hazards and quality-control requirements. 
Moreover, al 1 the firms had restricted access to current 
information on export opportunities, scope of potential markets, 
prices, and potential customers, distributors and agents. The 
exchange of information is inhibited by deficiencies in the 
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communications infrastructure, a particularly acute problem for 
smaller and newer firms. 
The first steps towards establishjng an export business are 
specially difficult, given lack of experience, and this 
insufficiency of information makes these initial efforts even 
harder. Because of their lack of familiarity with exporting, 
firms frequently overestimate the problems of selling abroad, and 
engage in time··-consuming practices to meet unclear objectives. 
Few of the new entrants have had access to expert counseling and 
assistance, at a price that they could afford, not even from the 
government. The nationalized banks have few specialist 
knowledgeable about specific foreign markets and/or non-
traditional commodities. 
Many of the problems faced have their roots in 
organizational deficiencies and limited managerial abilities. 
About one-half of the firms studied do not have an institutional 
structure suitable for exporting. This is more frequently a 
problem for rural firms, which face a limited supply of local 
talent. Low salaries have compounded the problem. Coopef res a 
had five general managers in four years and the board has denied 
increases above the present $25, 000 monthly salary. Several 
firms have had problems in filling medium-level technical 
administrative, supervisory, and managerial positions; while 
tightly-held family firms (Compafiia Exportadora de Mariscos) have 
been reluctant to hire outside managers, who may eventually work 
foz· the competition. Unable to attract qualified managers, these 
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firms are run by their proprietors, some of whom have only a 
modest formal education. About one-half had not attended 
college; a few did not even have a high-school diploma. In the 
case of small firms, less than one-half had received vocational 
training and less than one-quarter spoke a foreign language. 
Almost none had even a verbal command of another language 
different from English. Skill formation has been largely 
concentrated on the apprenticeship of individual trades. Only a 
few have had prior experience in modern, large-scale enterprises. 
As a result, their firms lack clearly-defined export goals, 
policies, and procedures. 
Organizational limitations are compounded, in the case of 
cooperatives and the smaller firms, by the lack of financial 
records. In one case no records were kept at all. Even when 
they are kept, these records are deficient and are not used as a 
management tool. Cooperatives were most lax in their accounting, 
and were frequently surprised to find out that they had incurred 
in losses. The failure to organize accounting and financial 
management procedures resulted in under capitalization and 
inadequate inventory management. 
Technical problems in production were frequent, except for 
Pindeco, Linda Vista, Motorola, and possibly American Flowers, 
all of which had major foreign connections and/or ownership. At 
the other extreme, Coopeindia, with nearly 1,000 members 
scattered throughout the country, had problems in quality 
control. Insects have been the source of the major technical 
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difficulties. In the case of cooperatives, the advice given by 
technical assistance agencies to individual members has been 
often contradictory. In the case of Hortifruti, which purchased 
from independent growers who originally sold in the local market, 
these were unable to meet international standards. 
Cultivation and harvesting have been two key areas where 
costly mistakes are often made. Cutting and shading have been 
done incorrectly and untimely harvesting has reflected inadequate 
training and lack of familiarity with production techniques and 
market demands. Many problems have reflected inaccurate and 
outdated information, on topics such as the emergence of pests, 
the application of agrochemicals, the status of the crops of 
competitors and, in the case of cooperatives, the status of 
member crops. Yields have been low in strawberries, cafia india, 
shrimp, and tropical fruit and vegetables. Production 
programming is a major problem area where much improvement is 
needed. Many exporters lack a systems' view to coordinate the 
various stages of the exporting process. Excess production 
increased costs, while shortages wasted opportunities. 
Among the most serious obstacles, emphasized by all 
exporters, have been the complexity of procedures and high 
transactions costs associated with imports of raw materials, 
intermediate inputs, parts, and capital goods. With the 
exception of Linda Vista, which uses local inputs, all firms 
reported problems in securing high-quality imports within a 
reasonable time frame. Several exporters complained that the 
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Ministry of Agriculture's requirement that they use only 
registered agrochemicals prevented them from using the newest 
products offered in the market. Long delivery periods, due to 
cumbersome import procedures and regulations, are particularly 
costly for m~qgil~ firms. One exporter claimed that the greatest 
obstacle to exports in Costa Rica was "la aduana'' (customs). It 
still takes Motorola two working days to clear a shipment through 
customs, too long for an industry where the time cycle is 
critical. Protective tariffs make foreign inputs expensive, 
while highly-priced domestic substitutes are of low quality. 
Boxes and packing materials are still the relatively most 
expensive input into exporting operations, due to protectionism 
and the small size of purchases. Small firms suffered the most 
from unreliable, inadequate supplies of imported inputs, in view 
of the fixed cos ts of import licenses and the small scale of 
their transactions. Even when foreign-exchange allocations were 
available for small firms, their limited administrative resources 
jeopardized their ability to follow the bureaucratic procedures 
to get a license. 
Fewer and less severe problems have been observed at the 
packing stage. However, due to packing materials which did not 
conform with international specifications, shipments of tropical 
fruit and vegetables, strawberries, and ornamental plants were 
rejected by the importer, with a total loss to the exporter. In 
view of the magnitude of the consequences of poor packing 
practices, firms have been quick to correct any deficiencies. 
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Several of Coopeindia's shipments of ornamental plants to Japan 
were rejected fcJL~ lack of adequate fungicide treatment for the 
long journey. In other cases, produce still coated with 
pesticide has been spotted and impounded by inspectors of the 
importing country. Al though pesticides used in Costa Rica are 
legal, they may exceed approved levels, if growers spray 
regularly, rather than during times of high insect infestation. 
Most of these problems, frequent in the early years, have been 
overcome with experience, and do not represent problems of 
importance for seasoned exporters. 
Losses due to storage mishaps have been commonplace. 
Insufficiently precooled mangoes (Hortifruti) ripened beyond 
sellable conditions in Europe. The protectjon of inventories has 
been taken loosely by cooperatives and small exporters. 
Coopefresa kept its refrigeration facilities, with $10,000 worth 
of product, operating with no spare engine for three months, 
after it malfunctioned, although strawberries decompose within a 
few hours. 
Air transportation has presented more obstacles than ocean 
shipping. Delays of flights caused severe losses to four of the 
six exporters which rely on air shipments. Failure to design 
appropriate era tes, mo is tu re, and to a much lesser degree, 
pilferage have caused losses during sea journeys. The 
infrastructure for air transportat.ion has also weighed heavily 
against exporters, primarily of perishables. Loading of cargo in 
the rain has been frequent, mostly at the Santamaria airport, 
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while products left overnight unsheltered at the airport have 
been exposed to insect infestation. Cargos have been impounded 
abroad for carrying insects. Overseas air transportation was the 
most crippling problem for strawberry and electronics exports 
during the 1985-87 period, due to the decline in capacity and 
frequency of flights to Miami. This was a major cost of the 
limitations on landing rights to foreign carriers, the regulation 
of rates (floors) ,and other monopolistic practices resulting from 
aviation regulation. In addition, short routes and low traffic 
densities, which determine aircraft size, increase costs. 
Countries offering competitive products export at similar or 
lower transportation costs from more distant places. High local 
port tariffs and the protection of national fleets raise costs to 
levels equivalent to those paid by Ecuatorian exporters shipping 
to Miami. High costs of sea transport have been a key deterrent 
to exports to the West Coast of the United States, Canada and 
Japan. Service to Japan and Canada has been suspended, nearly 
closing all access to these markets. Port tariffs and low volume 
were the single most important factors. Lack of freight 
insurance for exporters of perishables has been an additional 
deterrent. In Hortifruti's early days (1979), transport handling 
and cargo hazards had to be fiercely contested, even in court, 
against forwarders who did not guarantee their shipments and 
would even insist in collecting freight when shipments arrived in 
poor conditions due to their neglect. 
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At least one-half of the firms lack a clear marketing 
strategy (export objectives, distribution tactics, and sales 
promotion). 
Many prefer 
A major problem has been improper market selection. 
to export to the United States, al though market 
potential is greater elsewhere. Reluctance of Coopeindia and of 
Compafiia Exportadora de Mariscos to sell more profitably in 
Europe reflected inability to deal in other languages and fear of 
dealing with distant customers. Transportation premiums, 
insufficient information, special trade regulations, and lack of 
counseling compounded the suboptimal market selection. Besides 
Linda Vista, American Flowers, and Pindeco, all other exporters 
operated with limited market information. The former had good 
market intelligence due to integration of the exporting-importing 
activities, an advanced communications system, and resources to 
spend management time in the foreign market place. Many of these 
deficiencies reflected more than two decades of operating in a 
relatively easy, protectionist business environment. 
Selection of overseas distributors has been difficult. 
Prior knowledge about reputation has been scarce. Information 
about facilities and the distributor's management and sales 
methods has also been limited. Monitoring their performance has 
been almost impossible. Exporters have been forced to continue 
with a poor relationship during the duration of the contract. 
Exporters of perishables have had the greatest losses. The 
Coopefresa-Calz6n fixed-price arrangement,while leaving most of 
the marketing risks up to the cooperative, reduced its profit 
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potential. Hortifruti experienced the riskiest arrangements, 
selling on a consignment basis. In contrast, American Flowers 
has always pre-sold its product and has so been insulated from 
price risks. 
Consignment arrangements, used by most firms, lead to 
mistrust and exploitation, in the form of broken contracts 
without effective recourse, arbitrarily rejected shipments, high 
commissions and sometimes huge price markups, delayed payment and 
the absence of sufficiently clear and frequent communications 
between broker and exporter. It has been almost routine for 
brokers to fail to make timely payment of shipments. Total 
default hurt one-quarter of the firms. Hortifruti suffered heavy 
losses in the early 1980s, when the brokers did not pay for four 
containers of fresh fruit and vegetables. This has been usually 
the riskiest part of the business. Lack of export credit 
insurance has deterred exporters from making competitive offers 
to clients who request extended terms of payment. Unfortunately, 
most Costa Rican exporters cannot reach more advanced stages of 
the distribution chain (supermarkets and other retailers) due to 
relatively small and erratic volumes. Pindeco and Linda Vista 
have solved this problem through vertical integration. Costa 
Rican pineapples are now a regular feature in American 
supermarkets. Problems have been particularly acute when the 
distributor has been granted exclusive rights. 
The cooperatives and small firms have accepted prices which 
did not guarantee a sufficient return. Most companies frequently 
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set their price as domestic cost plus "a percentage" to cover 
transportation and handling. Traveling expenses, legal fees, 
communications, provisions for bad debt, costs of market 
research, and other expenses typical of exporting activities have 
not been included in price computations. An additional 
complication have been the benchmark export prices (for fresh 
flowers, pineapples, and shrimp) set by the Central Bank to 
discourage under-invoicing. When these prices are set too high, 
sales abroad are discouraged, unless the exporter is willing to 
put forward additional hard currency. This has been the case with 
small-size, low-value varieties of shrimp, for which the 
benchmark has been above the export pr ice. The absence of a 
local market to dispose of non-exportable surpluses also 
discourages exporters. 
American Flowers, Motorola and Compafiia Exportadora de 
Mariscos have found it cheaper to borrow abroad, while the 
cooperatives have had access to cheaper domestic sources of 
funds. Loans from special programs, at preferential rates, were 
few and highly contested, so all exporters in the sample saw no 
merit in pursuing them. No one ever attempted to borrow from 
FOPEX, FODEIN, and similar programs. Transactions costs have 
been too high. Lack of experience with new products limits the 
supply of credit from the nationalized banks. Most exporters 
rely heavily on their working capital and/or personal lines of 
credit, which are very Jimi.ting. Self-finance is predominant 
even for the larger firms. There were universal complaints about 
.. 
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delays in loan processing, about high collateral requirements, 
and the unwillingness to accept specialized assets as collateral 
(vessels and inventories), as well as lack of knowledge among 
lenders about non-traditional exports, who then overestimate the 
resulting risks. The credit squeeze was exacerbated by business 
practices which require that all firms extend credit to 
importers, but pay cash for purchased inputs and, in the case of 
cooperatives, make advances to producers. 
Government export services have focused the least assistance 
on small- and medium-size firms. Export promotion policies have 
been inconsistent and have lacked continuity. Too many programs 
have been established and subsequently abandoned due to 
administrative and/or financial shortcomings. CENPRO, CINDE, 
MINEX and other agencies compete for attention, follow isolated 
and often inconsistent policies, and increase the exporter's 
transactions costs. They provide large piles of marginally 
interesting literature, add to red tape, and suffer from 
deficiencies similar to those of their potential beneficiaries. 
